


Hardware-Based Domain Virtualization for Intra-Process Isolation of Persistent Memory Objects

Yuanchao Xu, ChenCheng Ye, Yan Solihin, Xipeng Shen




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
Persistent Memory (PM)



Attach & Detach Programming Model




Security is more Important for PM



Intra-process Isolation

Process Address Space




Intra-process Isolation for PM

Domain

(unique ID =PMO ID)



Persistent Memory



Domains → PKeys

Intel Memory Protection Keys

16 protection keys





Intra-process Isolation for PM

Domain

(unique ID =PMO ID)




Persistent Memory



Intel Memory Protection Keys


16 protection keys



Domains → Keys

Hundreds of active domains

Contribution




Outline

- Intel Memory Protection Keys (MPK)
- Virtualization Analysis
- MPK Virtualization
- Domain Virtualization
- Evaluation

Intel Memory Protection Keys (MPK)

Memory



Thread 1

WRPKRU (PKey 1, RW)

Thread 1 PKRU Register


PKey 1 Permission (--)	...
------------------------	-----

Thread 2 PKRU Register

PKey 1 Permission (--)	...
------------------------	-----

Intel Memory Protection Keys (MPK)

Memory



Thread 1 PKRU Register

PKey 1 Permission (RW)	...
------------------------	-----

Thread 2 PKRU Register

PKey 1 Permission (--)	...
------------------------	-----




Page permission \wedge PKey permission

Thread 2

Intel Memory Protection Keys (MPK)

Memory



Thread 1 PKRU Register

PKey 1 Permission (--)	...
------------------------	-----

Thread 2 PKRU Register

PKey 1 Permission (--)	...
------------------------	-----

Intel MPK Workflow

Page Table

PFN	Pkeys
100	NULL(0)
101	NULL(0)
102	NULL(0)
103	NULL(0)
104	NULL(0)
...	...

TLB

PFN	Pkeys
100	1

Access to 100

PKRU Register

PKKey 0 Perm.	PKKey 1 Perm.	...
---------------	---------------	-----

Pkey (1)

Inefficiency of Software Virtualization

Clean Pkeys

Set Pkeys


TLB invalidations

Store and restore permissions

Page Table

TLB

PKRU Register



All steps are needed when access evicted domain/PMO!

~4000 cycles, 1 eviction per 1000 instructions ~ 400% overhead

Two Hardware Virtualization Design

Clean Pkeys

Set Pkeys

TLB invalidations

Store and restore permissions

MPK Virtualization

Two Hardware Virtualization Design

Clean Pkeys

Set Pkeys

TLB invalidations

Store and restore permissions


Domain Virtualization

MPK Virtualization

Page Table

PMO 1		PMO 2	
PFN	Pkeys	PFN	Pkeys
100	NULL(0)	200	NULL(0)
101	NULL(0)	201	NULL(0)
102	NULL(0)	202	NULL(0)
103	NULL(0)	203	NULL(0)
104	NULL(0)	204	NULL(0)
...

Consecutive Virtual Address



MPK Virtualization

Page Table

PMO 1		PMO 2	
PFN	Pkeys	PFN	Pkeys
100	NULL(0)	200	1
101	NULL(0)	201	1
102	NULL(0)	202	1
103	NULL(0)	203	1
104	NULL(0)	204	1
...

Consecutive Virtual Address



MPK Virtualization

Page Table


PMO 1		PMO 2	
PFN	Pkeys	PFN	Pkeys
100	NULL(0)	200	1
101	NULL(0)	201	1
102	NULL(0)	202	1
103	NULL(0)	203	1
104	NULL(0)	204	1
...

Consecutive Virtual Address

Virtual Address Range

Pkey

PTE with PKey




TLB


PKey

PKRU Register


MPK Virtualization




MPK Virtualization



MPK Virtualization




MPK Virtualization



MPK Virtualization

No extra runtime overhead

Fast permission changes



No system calls

Two entry updates

Programmer Transparent

Second Hardware Virtualization Design

Clean Pkeys


Set Pkeys

TLB invalidations

Store and restore permissions

Domain Virtualization

Inefficiency from TLB invalidations



Index represents PKey

PKey 5 Perm

Thread 0 PKRU register

... PMO X ...

Thread 1 PKRU register

... PMO X ...

...

Thread 20 PKRU register

... PMO X ...


Inefficiency from TLB invalidations




Inefficiency from TLB invalidations



Domain Virtualization



Domain Virtualization




Evaluation Methodology

- Workloads:
 - WHISPER benchmarks for 1 PMO
 - Microbenchmarks with multiple PMOs
- Access pattern of multiple PMOs
 - Randomly choose a PMO ID to access
- Architectural Overhead:
 - Sniper Simulator (details in the paper)

Performance

- Microbenchmarks for multiple PMOs



Conclusion

- **Proposed protecting PMO by using intra-process isolation**
- Uncovered scalability limitations of software MPK virtualization for PMOs
- Designed the **hardware MPK virtualization** that **builds on top of MPK**, achieving **10X** speedup for 1024 domains
- Designed the **domain virtualization** that achieves **50X** speedup for 1024 domains